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LEGAL EDUCATION AS HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY
DARA E. PURVIS*
WOMEN are underrepresented throughout legal academia from theranks of professors down to the “blawgosphere” of law professor
blogging.1  Reading past analyses of gender imbalances in legal education
is depressing in its consistency: as Morrison Torrey wrote thirteen years
ago,
it does provoke the question of exactly when we have enough
“evidence” of the gender, race, and heterosexual bias in legal ed-
ucation for legal educators to take this problem seriously.  How
many more studies do we need?2
Similarly, reading past pronouncements of the likelihood of meaningful
action triggers a cynical response when comparing the hopeful state-
ment—that “law schools are on the brink of constructive and far reaching
change”—with a publication date of 1998.3  That said, until legal educa-
tion has solved its gender problem, this Article and the Symposium of
which it is a part are a necessary and hard conversation that is still worth
having.  To that end, this Article makes two contributions: first, it is impos-
sible to talk about gender in legal academia, or indeed in the legal profes-
sion writ large, without looking at the journey of women law students.4
Women law students continue to face unequal experiences of legal educa-
tion as well as worse results in the tangible markers that lead to profes-
sional opportunities after graduation.  The gendered inequality of legal
education thus reverberates through the rest of the legal profession, in-
cluding academic leadership.  Second, this Article is the first to explicitly
use masculinities theories to frame the gendered problems of legal educa-
tion, in ways that help inform past reform proposals.  In the uncertain
times prompted by the current coronavirus pandemic, framing gendered
* Professor, Penn State Law; Yale Law School, J.D.; University of Cambridge,
M.Phil.; University of Southern California, B.A.  Thanks to the students of the
Villanova Law Review for running an excellent symposium and their thorough
editing.
1. See Jane Murphy & Solangel Maldonado, Reproducing Gender and Race Ine-
quality in the Blawgosphere, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 239 (2018).
2. Morrison Torrey, Yet Another Gender Study?  A Critique of the Harvard Study
and a Proposal for Change, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 795, 797 (2007).
3. Sarah Berger et al., “Hey! There’s Ladies Here!!”  Reflections on: Becoming Gentle-
men: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change by Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, and
Jane Balin, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1022, 1025 (1998).
4. My use of the term women and other feminine terms is not intended to
exclude nonbinary law students, who also face all of the challenges discussed in
this Article in addition to hurdles caused by societal failure to recognize their
gender.
(1145)
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legal education as a problem of hegemonic masculinity helps to indicate
why diversifying legal education will benefit all students.
Over the past few decades, a number of surveys and studies have
chronicled how women law students have different and inferior exper-
iences of law school.  One of the most dramatic aspects of this begins in
the classroom and how often students of different genders speak in class.
Women law students are less likely to volunteer, less likely to speak in class
overall, and less comfortable as a result.  As a 1988 discussion of the im-
pressions of Yale Law School women put it, “[t]he classroom was the cruci-
ble of our criticisms of ourselves and of the law school.  There, many of us,
longtime class participants, learned silence.”5
How often students of different genders spoke up in class was the
subject of some of the earliest research regarding gender in legal educa-
tion.6  Initially, the silencing of women students happened as the result of
egregiously sexist actions by professors, who avoided calling on women
students or called on them only in order to denigrate them.7  This overt
sexism is generally gone from law school classrooms, but surveys and stud-
ies throughout the years create a strikingly consistent picture.  Over and
over, the conclusion is the female students speak less in class: for Stanford
students in 1988,8 Berkeley law students in 1988,9 students at nine Ohio
law schools in 1993,10 Brooklyn Law School students in 1995,11 Yale Law
School students in 2002,12 Harvard in 2005,13 Boston College in 2012,14
and the University of Chicago in 2017.15
5. Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1332–33 (1988).
6. See Marjorie L. Girth, UB’s Women in Law: Overcoming Barriers During Their
First Hundred Years, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 51, 61 (2001).
7. See Gwen McNamee, Alliance for Women Battles Law School Gender Bias, CHI.
B. ASS’N REC., May 1995, at 38.
8. See Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An
Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1242
(1988).
9. See Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted But Not Accepted: Outsiders
Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 29, 50 (1989).
10. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender Issues in
Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 325–26 (1994).
11. See Marsha Garrison et al., Succeeding in Law School: A Comparison of Wo-
men’s Experiences at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pennsylvania, 3 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 515, 524–25 (1996).
12. See Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education Is Failing Women,
18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 403–09 (2006).
13. See Adam Neufeld, Costs of an Outdated Pedagogy? Study on Gender at Harvard
Law School, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 511, 531 (2005).
14. See Lauren A. Graber, Are We There Yet? Progress Toward Gender-Neutral Legal
Education, 33 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 67 (2013).
15. See Mallika Balachandran et al., Speak Now: Results of a One-Year Study of
Women’s Experiences at the University of Chicago Law School, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 647,
657.
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This is not to say that male students enjoy being cold-called or all
volunteer without hesitation—the verbal sparring of a traditional law
school classroom is uncomfortable for lots of students of all genders.  Wo-
men students, however, seem disproportionately intimidated into silence.
Even in surveys that ask students who do not voluntarily speak in class why
they don’t, men are more likely to say they weren’t prepared, whereas wo-
men are more likely to say they were afraid.16  Women students are also
more likely to say that their fellow students do not respect what they say in
class.17
Judgment in the classroom flows not only horizontally between stu-
dents but also vertically between students and professor.  Where in the
past, male professors judged women students harshly, in present day stu-
dents also judge women professors more harshly than traditionally creden-
tialed white cisgender male professors.  This plays out in ways that
reverberate throughout legal academia.  Student evaluations, which uni-
versally play a role in promotion and tenure decisions, judge women
professors more harshly.18  In the classroom, students are more likely to
question a woman professor’s knowledge and status.19  Students who be-
come members of law reviews are then responsible for selecting articles for
publication, the “bread and butter” of scholarly achievement.20  Women
professors are underrepresented as authors in law review publications
even below their underrepresented levels on law school faculties, even
though one study found that articles by women professors are cited more
than articles by men.21
Women students lag behind in achieving other markers of law school
success.  For example, women students on average often have lower grades
than men, even where their undergraduate GPAs were the same.22  Other
academic achievements are often tied to grades, such law review member-
ship, where women students are underrepresented.23  Women students
also publish fewer notes in law reviews.24
16. See Felice Batlan et al., Not Our Mother’s Law School?: A Third-Wave Feminist
Study of Women’s Experiences in Law School, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 124, 139 (2009).
17. See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Diversity Matters: Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in
Legal Education, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 31–32 (2003).
18. See Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal
Academy, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 337 (1996).
19. See id. at 341.
20. See Michael J. Higdon, Beyond the Metatheoretical: Implicit Bias in Law Review
Article Selection, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 339, 347–49 (2016).
21. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Lee Petherbridge, Gender Disparity in Law
Review Citation Rates, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 782–86 (2018).
22. See Allison L. Bowers, Women at the University of Texas School of Law: A Call
for Action, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 117, 135 (2000); Neufeld, supra note 13, at 540;
Richard K. Neumann Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 321 (2000).
23. See Balachandran et al., supra note 15, at 656.
24. See Jennifer C. Mullins & Nancy Leong, The Persistent Gender Disparity in
Student Note Publication, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 397–99 (2011).
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In addition to garnering external recognition, women students also
face more challenges to their confidence and emotional well-being in law
school.  Women students feel worse about their own abilities to succeed.25
One study found that in a negotiation exercise—a skill often identified as
an alternative to the stereotypical antagonistic arguments of law school—
female students rated themselves as less competent than male students
did, even though outcomes were equal across genders.26  Surveys also con-
sistently find that women students are unhappier during law school,27
even at schools where their performance is more equal to men.28  Women
students report more feelings of alienation,29 leading to frustration and
disillusionment with the law.
Such disparities in performance and emotional well-being reverberate
throughout their careers.30  Women lawyers are less likely to become law
firm partners or secure other leadership roles.31  Women lawyers are un-
happier than their male counterparts, and the gendered disparity is
greater in law than among people with other types of degrees.32  Women
lawyers are underemployed more than men33 and are more likely to leave
the legal profession altogether.34
Meera Deo has chronicled in detail the significant differences in rank
and treatment of women professors throughout academia.35  Women are
more likely to be in lower status jobs within academia.36  They are more
likely to be legal writing professors, who often are not tenure track and
25. See Batlan et al., supra note 16, at 142–43.
26. See Sandra R. Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and
Over-Confident Men: Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 271, 291–92 (1999).
27. See Paula Gaber, “Just Trying to Be Human in This Place”: The Legal Education
of Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 166 (1998).
28. See Graber, supra note 14, at 64–66.
29. See Celestial S.D. Cassman & Lisa R. Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law School?
Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Legal Education at King Hall, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1209,
1271 (2005); Garrison et al., supra note 11, at 529.
30. See Paola Cecchi-Dimeglio, Designing Equality in the Legal Profession: A Nudg-
ing Approach, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 10 (2018).
31. See Deborah L. Rhode, Diversity and Gender Equity in Legal Practice, 82 U.
CIN. L. REV. 871, 872 (2014).
32. See Joni Hersch & Erin E. Meyers, Why Are Seemingly Satisfied Female Lawyers
Running for the Exits? Resolving the Paradox Using National Data, 102 MARQ. L. REV.
915, 936 (2019).
33. See Jane R. Bambauer & Tauhidur Rahman, The Quiet Resignation: Why Do
So Many Female Lawyers Abandon Their Careers?, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 799, 807
(2020).
34. See Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on
20 Years Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 515, 527
(2013).
35. See Meera E. Deo, The Ugly Truth About Legal Academia, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
943, 943 (2015); see also MEERA E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN
LEGAL ACADEMIA (2019).
36. See Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School Faculties, 2009
B.Y.U. L. REV. 99, 99.
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lack the job protection, higher salaries, and higher prestige of other aca-
demic positions.37  Even within tenure-track professors, individual topics
are coded as masculine or feminine, and the subjects more likely to be
taught by women are seen as less prestigious.38  Even within identical aca-
demic ranks, women professors suffer a pay gap.39  Some schools who are
required to report faculty salaries publicly have used secret measures such
as forgivable loans to supplement certain professors’ salaries without alert-
ing women professors to the pay difference.40
Different scholars’ explanations for the stubborn longevity of gender
disparity in legal education offer a number of ideas, all of which likely
contribute simultaneously.  One thread of analysis looks at the skills that
current legal pedagogy rewards, what one group of scholars called the
“gladiator model.”41  Law school emphasizes “individualism and hierar-
chy,” rather than more relational values that women students may be more
likely to emphasize.42  Adversarial modes of argument and learning domi-
nate, exemplified by the Socratic dialogue and class discussion that pits
students against one another.43
Even the language of legal analysis is in some ways coded as male.44
Learning to frame facts within the language and arguments of the law,
seeking neutral principles that apply across different facts, asks women stu-
dents to erase key context specific to their gender, reimagining the world
as men will understand it.45  The perspective of judges and legislators of
the past—almost all white men—is deemed to be neutral, whereas per-
spectives informed by the lived experiences of individual modern plaintiffs
and students is biased.  Judge Dorothy Nelson of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals was a member of the first all-female appellate panel in 1981
(alongside Ninth Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher and District Court
37. See Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law
Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
38. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occu-
pational Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293, 327
(2004).
39. See Melissa Hart, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination in
Academia, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 873, 877–78 (2014).
40. See Paula A. Monopoli, The Market Myth and Pay Disparity in Legal Academia,
52 IDAHO L. REV. 867, 876–77 (2016).
41. See Berger et al., supra note 3, at 1035.
42. Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Gender, Legal Education, and Legal Careers, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 443, 449 (1991).
43. See Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetu-
ates Gender Bias in the “Real World” of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 55 (1995).
44. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 892–95 (1989).
45. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Con-
tributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 23–30
(1998).
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Judge Judith Keep sitting by designation).46  Their calendar included an
employment discrimination case brought by a female employee, and attor-
neys representing the employer argued that the judges should recuse
themselves, since their gender made them biased.47
Although little scholarship about the legal profession has used the
term, analysis of how the law, legal education, and the legal profession is
coded as male approaches a frame of analysis known as masculinities theo-
ries.  Masculinities, just as the term sounds, asks how society defines and
promotes what is masculine.48  Although masculinity is intentionally plu-
ralized to emphasize that there are many ways to be a man, hegemonic
masculinity is the single idea of manhood seen as better than all other, less
manly, alternatives.49  People of all genders may be judged harshly against
the standard of hegemonic masculinity, either because they fail to achieve
it or, because of factors including gender, sexual orientation, race, eco-
nomic class, and so on, they will never be able to achieve hegemonic
masculinity.50
Hegemonic masculinity is deeply encoded within the legal profession.
A handful of scholars have written about masculinities in the context of
law firms.  Richard Collier, for example, has discussed the role masculini-
ties plays in constructing employment in large law firms in a way incompat-
ible with family and caregiving responsibilities.51  Ann McGinley takes a
broader view and argues that masculinities embedded in law firms is one
reason that women and underrepresented groups have not been as suc-
cessful in firms as one would expect given their numbers among law
school graduates.52
46. See Judge Betty Binns Fletcher, First All Women’s Panel Opening Re-
marks, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Mar. 20, 1981), https://cdn.ca9.us-
courts.gov/datastore/library/2014/04/07/19810320-First_All_Women’s_Panel__
Opening_Remarks_By_Judge_Fletcher.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3AX-7S7Y].
47. The author clerked for Judge Raymond C. Fisher of the Ninth Circuit,
and Judge Nelson told this story at a lunch event in chambers for clerks.
48. See Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GEN-
DER & SOC’Y 201, 209 (2008).
49. See Dara E. Purvis, Trump, Gender Rebels, and Masculinities, 54 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 423, 430 (2019).
50. See id. at 439.
51. See Richard Collier, Rethinking Men and Masculinities in the Contemporary Le-
gal Profession: The Example of Fatherhood, Transnational Business Masculinities, and
Work-Life Balance in Large Law Firms, 13 NEV. L.J. 410, 427 (2013); see also Kenneth
G. Dau-Schmidt et al., Men and Women of the Bar: The Impact of Gender on Legal
Careers, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 49, 128 (2009) (“Although they begin the practice
of law with only a small difference in their average income, by fifteen years after
law school women on average earn significantly less a year ($132,170) than men
($229,529).  However, our means and regression analysis suggest that, once again,
the impact of lower income is disproportionately borne by women who do child-
care, who suffer a disadvantage similar to that of men who do childcare.”).
52. See Ann C. McGinley, Masculine Law Firms, 8 FIU L. REV. 423, 439–40
(2013).
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Coding certain traits as masculine and then measuring students by
their ability to match those traits is rife within legal education.  Christine
Haight Farley described the phenomenon without using the term mascu-
linities in 1996: “We think of law as rational, objective, abstract, logical/
analytical, and rigorous.  These are the characteristics more often attrib-
uted to men than to women.  Women are often seen as the mirror oppo-
site: as irrational, subjective, contextual, intuitive, flexible, and
compassionate.”53  Similarly, before I had the framing of masculinities to
label my analysis, I drew a similar conclusion about what behavior law
schools reward:
[L]aw school privileges a certain set of characteristics because
they are partly typical of some of the historically successful stu-
dents in a student body that used to be exclusively male.  The
circle is then completed when those characteristics are institu-
tionalized as defining what a successful law student looks like.
These characteristics include being willing to speak up aggres-
sively in class, voicing half-formed arguments and verbally spar-
ring with other students and the professor.  Such a student is
eager to explicitly compete with his peers, such as vying for lim-
ited spots on the school’s law review either through academic
performance or successful execution of a writing competition or
other admissions mechanism.  He “rushes the podium” to speak
with his professors after class, and visits their office hours fre-
quently enough to feel confident asking them for letters of rec-
ommendation for his clerkship applications.54
Obviously, men in law school may not excel at such activities, nor may
many of them enjoy the public competition of classroom dynamics.  Mas-
culinities help to explain this: very few men succeed at temporarily prov-
ing their hegemonic masculinity.55  Masculinities explain how gendered
expectations hurt people of all genders: men for being insufficiently mas-
culine, and people of other genders for never being capable of being mas-
culine at all.  Hegemonic masculinity takes a narrow sliver of possible
behavior and achievement, codes that behavior as masculine, and pun-
ishes anyone who fails to measure up.  Most men in law school will not
attain all of the competitive markers of success as a law student, but the
gendered coding of competition and verbal performance in the classroom
means that women law students are asked to perform masculine behaviors
53. Farley, supra note 18, at 349.
54. Dara E. Purvis, Female Law Students, Gendered Self-Evaluation, and the Promise
of Positive Psychology, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1693, 1708.
55. See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. Destefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 586 (2010).
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that will be interpreted as inappropriately aggressive.  As one recent publi-
cation put it, “being a good lawyer means being a bad woman.”56
Masculinities help to explain ongoing problems of gender through-
out legal academia in multiple ways.  First, it helps to explain the stubborn
persistence of a gender gap in performance and emotional health
throughout legal education.  Obviously, the most extreme and explicit sex-
ist acts within legal education have been largely removed.57  As outlined
above, however, from the first days of law school, women students have a
measurably worse experience.  This experience continues for women
throughout the legal profession, to the point that some women seeing the
poor professional outcomes for women attorneys choose not to go to law
school as a result.58  Legal education is firmly but silently captured by heg-
emonic masculinity, emphasizing explicit competition and rankings that
guarantee the kind of perpetual struggle that hegemonic masculinity re-
quires.  This makes legal education unpleasant for many students, but par-
ticularly so for women (and other underrepresented groups), who will
never truly measure up.  But because hegemonic masculinity is an unspo-
ken correlation to the skills law school rewards, and not an explicit prefer-
ence for male students, the gendered element is buried beneath
arguments about professional skills and abstract pedagogy.
Second, masculinities help to underscore why existing reform propos-
als will help.  Many scholars have proposed moving from a narrow scope of
educational goals to “qualitative diversity,” in which students are in-
structed in many skills important to different types of legal practice and
thought.59  Diversity of law school faculty is vitally important to present
multiple pictures of success and offer different opportunities for mentor-
ship.60  Masculinities help to explain why diversifying legal education is
important: not only because different legal jobs involve very different
skills, and not just because law students will perform better when given
opportunities to develop their own individual strengths, but also because
the act of diversifying what it means to succeed in law school will begin to
break down the gendered connotations of successful gunner.
Finally, masculinities help to resolve a potential fault line within femi-
nist legal scholars.  One line of argument in favor of expanding or chang-
ing what skills are valued in legal education incorporates assumptions
about what kinds of things are feminine strengths.  For example, one
56. Alice Woolley & Elysa Darling, Nasty Women and the Rule of Law, 51 U.S.F.
L. REV. 507, 536 (2017).
57. See Purvis, supra note 54, at 1695.
58. See Hollee Schwartz Temple, Clogged Pipeline: Lack of Growth at Firms Has
Women Skipping Law School, AM. B. ASS’N J. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.abajour
nal.com/magazine/article/clogged_pipeline_lack_of_growth_at_firms_has_wo
men_skipping_law_school [https://perma.cc/492Y-WFTU].
59. See Berger et al., supra note 3, at 1028–31.
60. See Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School
Environment on Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 114 (1996).
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thought experiment in what women-friendly legal education might look
like imagines an all-female school with no established administrative hier-
archy beginning day one with an intensive mediation seminar and a peda-
gogical focus on collaboration and communication.61  This may be the
dream legal education experience of some women, but it risks essentializ-
ing all women as preferring collaboration and mediation to appellate ad-
vocacy.  Promoting changes to legal education as benefiting women
students can edge into different voice feminism, which argues that certain
perspectives and traits are fundamentally feminine.62  Masculinities em-
phasize that the diversity of approaches that would enrich legal education
are not for the benefit of women law students, but all law students.  Educa-
tion in client counseling and alternative dispute resolutions are not help-
ful to add because they add a feminine voice or skill set, but because they
are useful for all students.  Diversifying the curriculum, in other words,
will help to break the link between hegemonic masculinity and legal edu-
cation entirely.
As this Article goes to print, law schools and the rest of the country
are just beginning to grapple with the fallout from the coronavirus pan-
demic, which has forced virtually all law schools into online education with
very little notice.  It is unclear how long legal education will be kept on-
line, and what the ultimate consequences will be, but it is worth conclud-
ing with a few thoughts about the opportunity it presents to rethink
aspects of legal education.  Multiple administrations of the LSAT have al-
ready been cancelled, which may accelerate experimentation in admitting
students without an LSAT score.  Data already indicate that women stu-
dents as well as other underrepresented groups are more likely to apply to
higher education without standardized tests, so broadening admission cri-
teria to law school may increase the numbers of women law students even
more.63  Online delivery of legal education may be more of a mixed bag:
on the one hand it might increase access for people with caregiving re-
sponsibilities, who still tend to be disproportionately women.64  If tradi-
tional curriculum is simply moved into a synchronous online format,
however, the conflict between caregiving and educational responsibilities
may actually make things worse.  If law schools are faced with longer peri-
ods of online delivery of education, they should take into account the vary-
ing resources and demands that students are juggling alongside their
studies.  Finally, current graduates are facing uncertain employment pros-
61. See Nancy E. Shurtz, Lighting the Lantern: Visions of a Virtual All-Women’s
Law School, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 63 (2004).
62. See Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 689 (2014); see also Purvis, supra note 54, at 1707 n.116.
63. See Andrea A. Curcio et al., Testing, Diversity, and Merit: A Reply to Dan
Subotnik and Others, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 206, 256 (2014).
64. See Abigail Cahak, Beyond Brick-and-Mortar: How (Cautiously) Embracing In-
ternet Law Schools Can Help Bridge the Legal Access Gap, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 495, 499.
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pects due to the cancellation of multiple bar exams, which will further
reinvigorate older criticisms of the bar exam as a final hurdle into the
legal profession.65
No matter how long the current crisis extends, it is clear that legal
education has a profound gendered problem from the first days of law
school.  Masculinities helps to explain how deeply rooted the problem is,
even as reforms have removed the worst sexism and the numbers of wo-
men law students has grown.  As law schools respond to social and eco-
nomic crisis, academic leadership should keep gender equity in mind as a
goal of any reforms.  Not only will it help women law students, later legal
professionals, and academics themselves, but it will improve legal educa-
tion for all students.
65. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission
to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696 (2002).
